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AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BALANCING THE PRINCIPLE OF
SOVEREIGNTY AGAINST THE DEMANDS
FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
For the first time in nearly four decades, the international com-
munity's aspiration of establishing a permanent international
criminal court seems close to becoming a reality.' A permanent
international criminal court would provide a forum for the adjudi-
cation of cases left unresolved by unavailable or ineffective na-
tional systems.2 One of the main obstacles facing its creation,
however, is the principle of sovereignty. This principle forbids the
1 See M. CherifBassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating of International Humanita-
rian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
1191, 1200 (1995) (discussing historical precedents of International Criminal Court); see
also Rupa Bhattacharyya, Establishing a Rule-of-Law International Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 57, 61 (1996) (describing attempts in 1951 and 1953 to establish
International Criminal Court, as well recent attempts begun in 1989); Christopher L.
Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent World Crimes Tribunal, 18-Fall
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 82 (1995) (crediting modern idea of establishing International
Criminal Court to 1899 Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes); Daniel H. Derby, Symposium, An International Criminal Court for the Future, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 308 (1995) (noting that after forty years of develop-
ment, establishment of permanent international criminal court appears to be finalizing);
Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes
Past Objections, 23 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 421 (1995) (tracing roots of international
criminal court to 1474 when Peter von Hagenbush was tried for crimes against "God and
man" following his rule over people of Breisach); Thalif Deen, United Nations: U.N. Moves
Closer to a Global Criminal Court, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 26, 1996, available in 1996
WL 11624975 (reporting on viability of Court's establishment).
2 See Preamble to Draft Statute: Report of the International Law Commission, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., 6th Comm., Supp. No. 10, at 43-44, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter 1994 ILC Report]. The Statute's Preamble emphasizes the court's intention to operate
only when there is no prospect of persons being tried in national courts. Id. at 44; see also
William N. Gianaris, The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal
Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 90 (1992). This neutral international forum would be a
potent supplement for defective or unavailable national judicial systems. Id.; Jamison,
supra note 1, at 436. An international criminal court could be used to adjudicate claims
that individual states prosecute inadequately, so long as another state wishes to challenge
actions taken by the initial state. Id. See generally Kristin B. Weissman, Comment, Extra-
territorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 494
(1994). The establishment of a permanent court would provide a neutral forum for adjudi-
cating international disputes. Id.
3 See Jelena Pejic, Panel, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 841, 860 (1997) (noting sovereignty has always been explicit obstacle to permanent
court's creation); see also Kai I. Rebane, Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for
an International Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INTrL L.J. 1636, 1664
(1996) (stating sovereignty concerns have perpetually barred creation of permanent court);
Daniel B. Pickard, Comment, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward a Permanent
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exercise of jurisdiction by one state over matters and parties
within the territorial limits of another independent state. 4 Sover-
eignty has long been considered the most fundamental right a na-
tion can possess.5 A permanent international criminal court, with
the power to establish its own jurisdiction as it deems necessary,
could potentially erode this right.6
The goal of an international criminal court is to provide a forum
in which individuals are held accountable for their crimes under
international law.7 This position represents a new way of acquir-
ing subject matter jurisdiction over defendants." Essentially, ju-
International Criminal Court for the Prosecution of International Crimes and Human
Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 435, 439 (1995) (calling resistance to surren-
der sovereignty "a primary obstacle" to court's establishment).
4 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. This section states: "Nothing contained in the present
charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.. ." Id.; see also Oyvind Osterund, Sovereign
Statehood and National Self Determination. A World Order Dilemma, in SUBDUING SOVER-
EIGNTr 30 (Marianne Heiberg ed., 1994) (proclaiming that sovereignty and non-interven-
tion are norms of international order).
5 See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-
Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1993). Sovereignty
is the fundamental concept around which international law presently is organized. Id.; see
also MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE
11 (1995). "Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is doubtless the most
precious." Id. quoting EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 154 (Joseph Chitty ed.,
1883); Kofi Darko Asante, Election Monitoring's Impact on the Law: Can It Be Reconciled
with Sovereignty and Nonintervention?, 26 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL. 235, 235 (1994). Sover-
eignty is the source from which all political powers are derived. Id. See generally 48 C.J.S.
International Law §§ 25-29 (1981). The sections cover sovereignty and its exercise. Id.
6 See Jelena Pejic, Essay, The International Criminal Court: Issues of Law and Political
Will, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1762, 1763 (1995) (discussing concerns that International
Criminal Court would encroach on state sovereignty); see, e.g., Jack Yost, A True Interna-
tional Court, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Nov. 22, 1995, at B7 (reporting that governments view court
as threat to sovereignty and therefore seek to limit its jurisdiction). See generally Jamison,
supra note 1, at 431 (commenting on general opinion that any interference with sover-
eignty is impermissible threat).
7 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 24, 25. The authors discuss accountability
in the context of international law as the right of a state or group to hold intervenors re-
sponsible for the consequences of their actions. Id.; see, e.g., The Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260(A)(III),
78 U.N.T.S. 278 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The
Genocide Convention specifically addresses individual accountability for crimes committed
in violation of international human rights law. Id. See generally David Stoelting, The Pro-
posed International Criminal Court, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1996, at 1. The International Crimi-
nal Court should be distinguished from the International Court of Justice at the Hague,
which has jurisdiction over states, not individuals. Id.
8 See James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 404, 410 (1995) (discussing jurisdictional issues addressed by ILC Draft
Statute); Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 111-12 (1995) [hereinafter Law
Without Borders] (explaining jurisdictional issues involved with international criminal
court). See generally James Podgers, The World Cries for Justice, 82-APR A.B.A. J. 52, 62
(1996) (stating that debate over jurisdiction of permanent court intensifies as its reality
nears).
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risdiction would be found using international norms (jus cogens)9
and a violation of those norms would vest jurisdiction in all
nations. °
The question of whether individuals can be held accountable for
violations of international law, regardless of their rank or political
position, has been debated since the Nuremberg trials.1 By estab-
lishing individual accountability, the Nuremberg judgments ex-
plicitly rejected the argument that state sovereignty could be used
as a defense for unconscionable acts.' 2
9 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 833 (6th ed. 1990) (defining jus cogens as "a norm ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community as a whole"); see also Karen Parker
& Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTING INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 411, 413 (1989) (categorizingjus cogens principles as "areas of great human
concern"); Lieutenant Colonel Elliot, Torture, 1993-Apr. ARMY LAw. 19, 19 (1993) (jus
cogens norms are based on "fundamental values of all states"); cf Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties, (in force Jan. 27, 1958) art. 531, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679, 679 (1969) (credited for establishing concept ofjus cogens as supreme, peremp-
tory law which carries greater weight than treaties or customs).
10 See Caroling Krass, Bringing the Perpetrators of Rape in the Balkans to Justice: Time
for an International Criminal Court, 22 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317, 362 (1994) (discuss-
ing when court could exercise jurisdiction); Monroe Leigh, Evaluating Present Options for
an International Criminal Court, 149 MIL. L. REV. 113, 118 (1995) (noting that jurisdiction
of court is limited to crimes under general international law).
11 See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 41-43 (1992). The Nu-
remberg trials prosecuted war crimes committed during World War II. Id. These proceed-
ings were later harshly criticized because they were carried out by the victorious powers
and charges were only brought against the vanquished Germans and Japanese. Id.; see also
Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Is a Permanent Nuremberg on the Horizon?, 18-Fall FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 103, 104 (1994). Nuremberg is credited and hailed for repudiating the notion
that individuals are not culpable if they acted pursuant to the orders of a superior. Id. See
generally Ved P. Nanda, World Needs Permanent Criminal Court, DENVER POST, Nov. 26,
1995, at E3, available in 1995 WL 10203335. The article heralded the 50th anniversary of
the Nuremberg and Tokyo post World War II war crimes trials, noting that the world com-
munity has continuously failed to establish a permanent international criminal court to
punish individuals guilty of war crimes. Id.
12 See Henry T. King, Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 135, 136-
37 (1996) (proclaiming Nuremberg penetrated veil of sovereignty); see also Nanda, supra
note 11, at E3 (noting "lofty" principles of Nuremberg: those responsible for wars of aggres-
sion will not go unpunished; war crimes are responsibility of individuals who cannot hide
behind cloak of sovereignty). See generally Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and In-
ternational Law, 18 FoRDHAM IN'L L.J. 1685, 1690 (1995) (explaining mechanisms through
which sovereign conduct is accountable to international norms).
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While no longer considered an absolute right,13 the principle of
sovereignty still thrives in international law14 and appears to be
incompatible with the aspirations of a permanent court.' 5 The
conflicting demands of national sovereignty and international or-
der have crippled prior attempts to establish such a court.' 6 Its
viability will depend on the continuation of individual accountabil-
ity under international law established at Nuremberg. 7 For this
to occur, there must be a shift in the balance between the sover-
eign rights of the states and the authority of the larger interna-
tional community.' 8
13 See Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International
Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 127, 142 (1995) (noting international law repudiates "admissibility of absolute sov-
ereignty as the basic principle of international law"); see also William Sanders, "Multilat-
eral Diplomacy", XXI BULLETIN, DEPT. OF STATE, No. 526, Aug. 8, 1949, at 163, 199, re-
printed in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 15, at 261 (1963) (claiming that principle of
absolute sovereignty is inappropriate when failing to yield to international community's
right to protect citizens); Satvinder S. Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty, and the Doctrine
of Exclusive Jurisdiction, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 225 (1994) (referring to notion of absolute
sovereignty as "a misnomer").
14 See William C. Plouffe, Jr., Sovereignty in the "New World Order": The Once and Fu-
ture Position of the United States, A Merlinesque Task of Quasi-Legal Definition, 4 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 49, 53 (1996) (referring to customary international law as source of sover-
eignty; characterizing sovereignty as most basic principle in international law); see also
FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 5, at 11 (describing sovereignty of states as being "of cardinal
importance" for international relations); Catherine J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self
Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 203 (1992)
(claiming state sovereignty is still given priority because it forms basis of state's identity in
international law); see, e.g., David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The
Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 203 (1994) (claiming
that international community often tolerates abuse of fundamental human rights out of
respect for political sovereignty). See generally Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship Be-
tween 'Permanent Sovereignty" and the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environ-
mental Damage, 26 ENVT'L. L. 1187, 1188 (1996) (asserting that sovereignty creates inter-
national law).
15 See Joel Cavicchia, The Prospect for an International Criminal Court in the 1990s, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 223, 223 (1992) (calling court's establishment inconsistent with national
sovereignty); see, e.g., Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of an International Criminal
Court, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 27, 28-29 (1996) (stating United States' position that trying
head of state by international tribunal was incompatible with sovereignty).
16 See Cavicchia, supra note 15, at 223 (claiming that competing forces of "sovereignty
and international order" have previously frustrated promulgation of permanent court). See
generally Richard C. Hottelet, This is No Time for Routine Diplomacy in Bosnia, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 19, 1996, at 19 (claiming sovereign rights cannot be roughly overridden
without disturbing world system).
17 See Ann F. Ginger, Symposium, The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights
Treaty, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1341, 1351 (1993) (stating that meeting "just requirements of
morality," people must live by principles established at Nuremberg); see also Elizabeth L.
Pearl, Note, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of Yugoslavia Provide an
End to Victors'Justice?, 30 AM. CRne. L. REV. 1373, 1410 (1993) (asserting that Nuremberg
trials reshaped world using international law to prosecute individuals accused of war
crimes).
18 See Pickard, supra note 3, at 460 (stating that insistence upon adhering to archaic
concept of sovereignty has prevented creation of international criminal court); see also Ca-
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This Note explores the principle of sovereignty and its relation
to the creation of a permanent international criminal court. Part I
of this Note examines sovereignty and its evolution in interna-
tional law. Part II discusses the legal issues surrounding the es-
tablishment of a permanent international criminal court and how
those issues may be reconciled with the principles of sovereignty.
Part III addresses the problems that sovereignty may pose to the
enforcement mechanisms of an international criminal court. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that an international criminal court will
actually assist nations in protecting their sovereign rights by em-
powering them to prevent criminal behavior.
I. SovEREIGNTY: ALIVE AND WELL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The English word sovereignty is derived from the French term
souverain: "A supreme ruler not accountable to anyone, except
perhaps to God."19 As various state systems developed, so too did
the definition of sovereignty. 20 Today, the meaning of sovereignty
depends upon its context.2 1
Generally, sovereignty encompasses two distinct yet interre-
lated meanings.2 2 First, sovereignty in its internal, domestic sense
provides for a state's power and authority "over all persons,
vicchia, supra note 15, at 223 (recognizing that countervailing, forces of "national sover-
eignty and international order" have frustrated attempts to establish court); Yost, supra
note 6, at B7 (noting governments see promulgation of international criminal court as
threat to sovereignty, and therefore seek to limit its jurisdiction).
19 See FOWLER & BUNOK, supra note 5, at 4 (citing Ivo D. DUCHACEK, NATIONS AND MEN:
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS TODAY 46 (1966)) (discussing origins of English word sovereign);
see also Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and
International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 324 (1991) (relating first theory of sover-
eignty as "the supreme power over actions and subordinates," which were not subject to
law).
20 See CAROLINE ToHMAs, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERVENTION 11 (1985) (dis-
cussing sovereignty as political concept which later became transformed); see also FOWLER
& BUNCK, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing multiple meanings of sovereignty); see, e.g., Louis
Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 33 (1996)
(noting that international system has moved beyond state sovereignty values and toward
human values).
21 See Brand, supra note 12, at 1689 (noting that throughout history, sovereignty has
had both internal and external components); see also FOWLER & BuNcK, supra note 5, at 6
(noting that meaning of sovereignty has varied according to issue addressed or question
raised); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 Am. J. INr'L L. 866, 866 (1990) (relating sovereignty's long varied history
during which it has had various "meanings, hues and tones" depending upon objectives of
those invoking it).
22 See Brand, supra note 12, at 1685, 1686 (describing two tiered notion of sovereignty);
see also van der Vyver, supra note 19, at 419 (suggesting two tiered approach accounts for
external independence as well as internal autonomy in international relations).
1997]
540 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:535
things, and territory within its reach."23 Second, sovereignty in an
external and international context concerns a state's right and
ability to independently manage its own affairs, without outside
interference or intervention. 24 International law consistently rein-
forces these two meanings by continuing to stress the importance
of the complete autonomy of the sovereign state to manage its own
internal affairs. 25 Sovereignty is also relevant in foreign rela-
tions 26 because it establishes each nation's international status.
2 7
This enigmatic concept is universally recognized to the extent that
is has been made tangible via the U.N. Charter.28
Sovereignty has less abstract functions as well. This principle
serves as a potent political weapon used to defend state indepen-
dence.29 It also contributes to a state's sense of dignity.30 Most im-
portantly though, is the continuation of a sovereign state's power
to provide security and protection to its citizens.3
A. Sovereignty is Limited in Certain Circumstances
Sovereignty in the external or international context continues to
be strong, however, it is not as absolute as its definition sug-
23 See J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 39 (1968) (discussing nature of internal
sovereignty); see also van der Vyver, supra note 19, at 417 (explaining various theories of
internal sovereignty which are limited by international human rights law; equating sover-
eignty with independence).
24 See van der Vyver, supra note 19, at 417-18 (commenting that sovereignty denotes
authority of state to manage its territory and its citizens).
25 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 1 (asserting that modern, fundamental
principle of sovereignty is that each state is master of its own territory).
26 See generally FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 5, at 11-32 (detailing why sovereignty
remains important today).
27 See THoMAs, supra note 20, at vii (noting that maintaining international system in
orderly fashion requires departure from traditional rules of governing); see also FOWLER &
BUNCK, supra note 5, at 11-20 (stating sovereignty is declaration of political responsibility
for governing, defending and promoting welfare of human community); Antti Korkeakivi,
Consequences of a "Higher" Law: Evaluation Crimes of State and Egra Omnes, 2 J. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 81, 117 (1996) (noting that sovereignty is desirable because it provides
predictability).
28 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (reaffirming belief that state autonomy should be
preserved in international system).
29 See FOWLER & BuNcK, supra note 5, at 20-24 (describing sovereignty as "handy tool"
that is used in international politics to defend state independence).
30 See Paul Mitchell, English Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational
Forcible Abduction After Alverez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 455 (1995) (assert-
ing that respect for national sovereignty 'protects and promotes" each nation's dignity).
31 See Brand, supra note 12, at 1696 (discussing vital role of sovereign as provider of
peace and security).
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gests.3 2 No state, however powerful, has been able to shield its
affairs completely from external influence. 33 Although sovereignty
continues to be a controlling force affecting international rela-
tions, the powers, immunities and privileges it carries have been
subject to increased limitations.3 4 These limitations often result
from the need to balance the recognized rights of sovereign na-
tions against the greater need for international justice.35
B. A Combination of Important Factors Have Emerged to
Compromise Sovereignty
Classical notions of sovereignty have faded, largely due to the
growing interdependence of the international community.36 Im-
proved levels of technology and communication have ostensibly
shrunk the world that we live in.3 7 As a result, people are increas-
ingly linked into broader communities.3 8 New international con-
cerns such as the deterioration of the environment 39 require many
nations to act in concert.4 ° In some areas of international concern,
the need for states to exert influence over others is necessary for
32 See Jamison, supra note 1, at 432 (asserting that notion of absolute sovereignty is "no
longer tenable"); see also Reisman, supra note 21, at 866-69 (stating no serious scholar
supports notion that sovereignty is absolute).
33 See Oyvind Osterud, Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination: A World
Order Dilemma, in SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 19 (calling uses of sovereignty
"murky and ambiguous"; hardly more than regulative idea; not supreme authority); see also
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 48-50 (4th ed. 1949) (finding problems with implication
that sovereignty exempts states from being subject to international law).
34 See Brand, supra note 12, at 1695 (describing various mechanisms making sovereign
conduct accountable to international norms).
35 See Crawford, supra note 8, at 408 (noting conflicting preferences for national jurisdic-
tion as opposed to internationalism in 1994 Draft Statute); Henkin, supra note 20, at 33-35
(describing how changing values have led to clear departure from sovereignty principle).
36 See, e.g., Brand, supra note 12, at 1695-96 (asserting that as world becomes interre-
lated through transportation and technology, distance between individuals contracts)
37 See THoMAs, supra note 20, at 5 (describing advances in communication as making
"mockery" of notion that states are impermeable); see also Grossman & Bradlow, supra
note 5, at 11 (discussing how technological changes over past twenty years have globalized
international community).
38 See Johan Jorgen Holst, Keeping a Fractured Peace, in SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY, supra
note 4, at 136. Current international economic interdependence and the penetration of bor-
ders by technology, news and lifestyles constrain the exercise of sovereignty. Id. This in
turn acts in contravention to the established notion that the sovereign territorial state is a
constituent unit of international society. Id.; see also THoMAs, supra note 20, at 5. Individ-
ual nations have become increasingly inter-reliant due to economics, financial trade struc-
tures, and availability of resources. Id.
39 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 14 (discussing growing recognition of global
environment which has impacted on jurisdictional boundaries).
40 See id. at 14, 15 (noting that international collaboration involves surrender of certain
national prerogatives along with willingness to surrender sovereignty to satisfy goals of
international community).
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successful resolution of disputes. 41 The corollary to this is the di-
minished significance given to sovereignty.
Another important factor limiting sovereignty and receiving in-
creased attention in recent years is the increased international
concern for human rights.4 2 For example, the atrocities committed
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia prompted intervention by
the United Nations to stop the gross human rights violations oc-
curring there.4 3 Additionally, various international agreements
have propelled the importance of individual rights to the forefront
of international law.44
A more active role on the part of the international community is
consistent with a sovereign's responsibility to protect its people,
and enhances rather than detracts from this notion of sover-
eignty.45 Although a nation cedes some sovereignty when it be-
41 See, e.g., Dorinda Lea Peacock, "It Happened and It Can Happen Again": The Interna-
tional Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C. J. IN'L L. & Comm. REG. 899, 927 (1997)
(noting that reports of Genocide in Rwanda prompted U.N. Security Council to take meas-
ures against those responsible). See generally Commander Roger D. Scott, Getting Back to
the Real United Nations: Global Peace Norms and Creeping Interventionism, 154 MIL. L.
REV. 27, 30 (1997) (calling sovereignty "the shield of the enemy").
42 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 16-18 (discussing growing involvement of
international organizations in protection of human rights).
43 See Simon Chesterman, Never Again... and Again: Law, Order, and the Gender of
War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALE L.J. 299, 315 (1997) (chronicling events leading
to U.N. intervention in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda). See generally Justin M. Swartz,
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Functional Equivalent to Prosecu-
tion, 3 DEPAUL DIG. INT'L L. 13, 25-27 (1997) (detailing investigations into reported gross
human rights violations occurring in Rwanda).
44 See African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 59
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). The agreement notes that fundamental human rights are
granted to all and this justifies their national and international protection. Id.; American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1970 O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, art. 33-51, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673, 678-80 (entered into force July 18, 1978). This
agreement enumerates the basic human rights that deserve protection. Id.; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 Dec. 16, 1966, art. 16, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). The agreement
stipulates that people have rights under the law in any place including their own nation.
Id.; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 45-46, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The Convention had a built in enforce-
ment mechanism. Id.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. VI, at 71 (1948). This resolution states that people
have basic human rights both internationally and within their own nation. Id. See gener-
ally Rebane, supra note 3, at 1637 (detailing various international agreements within last
fifty years protecting norms of international law).
45 See MAGDALENA M. MARTIN MARTINEZ, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 66 (1996) (claiming most significant inroads into traditional concept of sov-
ereignty were made by creation of international organizations); see also Nancy Arniston,
International Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sov-
ereignty?, 17-Sum FLETCHER F. WORLD AiFF. 199, 207 (1993) (noting that when states fail to
protect people's basic civil rights, international community should interfere); Brand, supra
note 12, at 1696 (claiming sovereign must participate in development of international law
in order to fulfill its role of providing security for its own subjects); Henkin, supra note 20,
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comes a party to an international agreement, it also receives cer-
tain protections which broaden its sovereignty.4 6 If sovereignty is
viewed as the power of a nation to protect its citizens, as it should,
fortifying itself with the aid of the international community only
enhances this objective. Therefore, the future development of in-
ternational law, which includes an international criminal court,
may hinge upon the continuing evolution of this rationale.4
The rationale that sovereignty is enhanced through interna-
tional cooperation provides the context which allows the United
Nations to thrive in its humanitarian efforts.49 It is also the con-
text in which the need for a permanent international criminal
court becomes more feasible.5" Arguably, whatever sovereign
at 43 (announcing that collective human intervention is current norm which must triumph
over arguments supporting sovereignty); Ravi Mahalingam, Comment, The Compatibility
of the Principles of Non-Intervention with the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221, 253 (1996) (pointing out consistency between sovereignty
and international protection of human rights).
46 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code & Court: Where They Stand
and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 391-92 (1992) (claiming that
entering into international agreements provides nations with as much benefit as any losses
that result from restrictions on sovereignty); Urs W. Saxer, The Transformation of the So-
viet Union: From a Socialist Federation to a Commonwealth of Independent States, 14 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 581, 601-02 (1992) (observing that treaties between states usually
serve to create sovereignty between treaty nations); see also Susan Wright, The Constitu-
tional Implications in France of the Maastricht Treaty, 9 TuL. EUR. & Crv. L.F. 35, 42-43
(1994) (discussing French mechanisms for establishing treaties with purpose being to en-
sure reciprocal benefits to offset loss of sovereignty).
47 See Ferencz, supra note 46, at 391-92 (asserting sovereign's ability to protect is
strengthened by participating in international organizations); see also Gregory H. Fox, The
Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 607 (1992)
(observing that international law is often concerned with reaffirming nation-state as essen-
tial forum for political activity by assuring that all citizens have political rights); Reisman,
supra note 21, at 869 (noting that international law focuses on people's sovereignty as
much as state sovereignty).
48 See Anthony P. Maingot, Sovereign Consent Versus State-Centric Sovereignty, in BE-
YOND SOVEREIGNTY 190 (Tom Farer ed., 1996) (calling gradual dilution of state sovereignty
not merely historic phenomenon but also "moral imperative"); see also Brand, supra note
12, at 1686 (asserting twenty-first century international law will be determined by continu-
ing evolution of perception of sovereignty).
49 See Fox, supra note 47, at 550-51 (noting that popular sovereignty became prominent
in conjunction with development of United Nations, each giving force to other); Kristen
Walder, An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as an Embodiment of
the Public/Private Distinction in International Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 173, 180-
81 (1994) (observing that United Nations' intervention to prevent human rights abuses is
consistent with its position respecting sovereignty); see also Roger Myers, A New Remedy
for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal
Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 73-74 (1990) (proposing that because human
rights violations are largely domestic, they require international intervention); Rebane,
supra note 3, at 1664 (detailing U.N. involvement in universal acceptance of individual
rights).
50 See Peter Burns, An International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult Union of Principle
and Politics, 5 CRIM. L.F. 341, 380 (1994). The major difficulty in garnering support for an
international criminal court has been the principle of sovereignty, but the current focus on
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rights are forfeited by submitting to the jurisdiction of an interna-
tional criminal court may be regained by the protection it will pro-
vide.51 Thus, the evolution of sovereignty and the increasing need
for international justice have now converged to the extent that the
next logical step is the creation of an international criminal court.
II. RECONCILING THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
World War II demonstrated the dangers inherent in an interna-
tional legal order based upon absolute sovereignty.52 The lessons
learned from viewing sovereignty in this manner provided the im-
petus for the international community to take action to prevent
these atrocities from recurring. 53 The international community's
response was the establishment of international organizations,
most notably the United Nations, which serve to protect the sover-
eign interests of each of its members.5 4
international human rights may overcome this barrier. Id.; see also Roger J.R. Levesqu,
Future Visions of Juvenile Justice: Lessons from International and Comparative Law, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1563, 1569-70 (1996). International human rights law reaches past na-
tional boundaries and covers private individuals, thus breaking barrier of state sover-
eignty. Id.; see, e.g., Rebane, supra note 3, at 1663, 1664. The author renews the call for a
uniform international criminal forum. Id. See generally Drinan, supra note 11, at 108. The
fact that human rights have been addressed so pervasively since World War II has made
opponents of an international criminal court based on sovereignty grounds reassess their
position. Id.
51 See Bhattacharyya, supra note 1, at 75 (arguing that International Criminal Court
would serve as deterrent against actions likely to threaten state's security); Brand, supra
note 12, at 1696, 1697 (delegating sovereign functions to international community to pro-
vide security should not be combated); see also Jules Deschenes, Towards International
Criminal Justice, 5 CraM. L.F. 249, 252 (1994) (intimating that resistance to International
Criminal Court is largely result of some heads of state concerned about being prosecuted
for their actions which threaten citizen's security). See generally Theodor Meron, Interna-
tional Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 554 (1995) (observing
that internal atrocities have far greater impact on international human rights laws be-
cause it occurs with greater frequency than with international conflicts).
52 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 2 (calling World War II "a powerful and
tragic lesson" on dangers of absolute sovereignty); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tar-
nished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965, 1009 (noting that atrocities perpetuated by
Nazi Germany during World War II compelled modern world to limit notions of absolute
sovereignty); see also Nagan, supra note 13, at 150 (observing that notions of absolute sov-
ereignty were overruled by Nuremberg).
53 See generally MARTrNEZ, supra note 45, at 67-69 (discussing creation of international
organizations).
54 See id. at 67 (noting that even "advanced" European Community is based upon recog-
nition of its member state's sovereignty); see also Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 2-4
(explaining that new organizations formed following World War, such as United Nations
and International Trade Organization, were organized with respect for sovereignty); see,
e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (preventing organization's interference in members' do-
mestic affairs with only limited exception).
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Such a response has continued in light of events such as the
atrocities committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. Two ad hoc5 5 tribunals have been created under
United Nations auspices to prosecute those responsible for grave
human rights violations.5 6 Protest that these tribunals impermis-
sibly encroached upon state sovereignty were overcome because
these tribunals were touted as temporary and situation specific.
These ad hoc tribunals later served as the impetus for the efforts
to create a permanent international criminal court.5 7 Despite
these efforts, establishing a permanent tribunal for crimes viola-
tive of international law within the principles of sovereignty will
be a challenge.5 8
In 1994, the International Law Commission submitted a draft
statute to the United Nations which provided a blueprint for an
international criminal court. 59 As the possibility of a permanent
international criminal court grew, so did the debate over the form
and jurisdiction of such a court.60 Predictably, concerns over sov-
55 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 41 (6th ed. 1990). Ad hoc means that the tribunals were
created "for this special purpose." Id.
56 See Payan Akhavan, Current Development, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 501 (1996)
(criticizing establishment of tribunals because of their failure to take preventive steps to
stop war crimes); see also Jennifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of
Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 171, 173
(1994) (observing that Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal was first to try victors in war);
Podgers, supra note 8, at 52 (reporting that ad hoc tribunals will greatly advance interna-
tional law); Robert B. Rosenstock, Essay, 1994 McLean Lecture on World Law: The Propo-
sal for an International Criminal Court, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 271, 279 (1994) (noting that
only question regarding establishment of war crimes tribunal for Rwanda was whether to
create one separate from Yugoslavia or extend Yugoslavian Tribunal's jurisdiction).
57 See Podgers, supra note 8, at 52 (claiming Tribunals broke down "psychological bar-
rier to international criminal court movement"); see also Lauren Comiteau, Tribunal Chief
Less Pessimistic on Bosnia Trials, CmuSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1996, at 6, available
in 1996 WL 5044162 (interviewing Tribunals' Presidents regarding their extraordinary sig-
nificance); Cedric Thornberg, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 1,
1996, at 72, available in 1996 WL 10201057 (reporting on tribunals' potential to leave "a
legacy of hope").
58 See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 81 (noting that principle of sovereignty might prevent
states from sending citizens out of country for criminal prosecution); see also Burns, supra
note 50, at 380 (observing that major barrier to past attempts at creating permanent tribu-
nal was conflict between sovereignty and proposed tribunal's jurisdiction). See generally
Podgers, supra note 8, at 52 (remarking on "galvanizing effect" of tribunal upon interna-
tional criminal court movement).
59 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2; see also Crawford, supra note 8, at 406 (providing
background information on 1994 Draft Statute). See generally Bassiouni, supra note 1, at
1200 (revealing that General Assembly of United Nations requested draft statute for per-
manent international tribunal as early as post World War II years).
60 See Cavicchia, supra note 15, at 235 (noting that early debate focused on whether
there was need for codified international penal law); Stuart H. Deming, War Crimes and
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ereignty lurked behind these discussions. 61 The debate focused on
two key questions: First, over what criminal acts would a perma-
nent court have jurisdiction, and second, when could a permanent
court exercise that jurisdiction.6 2
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
It has been suggested that the world is becoming increasingly
unified by universal norms.63 This assertion is dubious because
many nations, although willing to unite for some purposes,64 still
International Criminal Law, 28 AKRON L. REV. 421, 423 (1995) (comparing court with
broad versus narrow subject matter jurisdiction); Andrew Kelly, Plans for World Criminal
Court Held Up by Haggling, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Sept. 26, 1996, available in
LEXIS News Library (listing countries in favor of and opposed to creation of permanent
international criminal court); see also Betsy Pisik, U.N. General Assembly Faces Conten-
tious Session, WASH. TiMEs, Sept. 17, 1996, at A13 (reporting that many obstacles remain
before court is established). See generally Task Force Report, American Bar Association
Task Force on an International Criminal Court, 28 INT'L LAw. 475, 480 (1994) [hereinafter
Task Force] (relating change in sentiment among organization which now favors expanding
jurisdiction of proposed international criminal court).
61 See David Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, FOREIGN PoL'y, Mar. 1, 1996,
at 34, available in 1996 WL 10201027 [hereinafter Judicial Intervention] (discussing nu-
merous obstacles impeding establishment of court); see also Evered, supra note 77, at 125-
26 (noting that subject matter jurisdiction in some proposals is limited to case-by-case ba-
sis, allowing for state to choose what sovereignty to relinquish). See generally Dr. William
C. Gilmore, The Proposed International Criminal Court: Recent Developments, 5 TRNs-
NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 284-85 (1995) (observing tension between state sover-
eignty and international justice); Meron, supra note 50, at 554 (stating that sovereignty
has affected scope of international human rights law in context of internal conflicts).
62 See Report on the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995). The Committee
was most concerned with the jurisdiction of the proposed Court. Id.; see also Evered, supra
note 77, at 124. Members of the United Nations are worried about an international court
exercising its jurisdiction over their citizens. Id. There is a direct link between the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and the exercise of compulsory jurisdiction. Id.; Virginia Morris
& M. Christine Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Development, The Work of the Sixth Com-
mittee at the Fiftieth Session of the UN General Assembly, 90 AM. J. INr'L L. 491, 496-97
(1996). Many on the committee favored only a limited number of crimes under the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, while others favored a more expansive list. Id.
63 See Johan Jorgen Holst, Keeping a Fractured Peace, in SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY, supra
note 4, at 138 (noting that some values are universally accepted while others only are ac-
cepted by portion of international community); see also Elliott, supra note 9, at 19 (jus
cogens norms are based on "fundamental values of all states"); Parker & Neyon, supra note
9, at 413 (noting jus cogens governs most areas of human concern).
64 See THoMAs, supra note 20, at viii. In theory, there are no exceptions to the norm of
non-intervention into the internal affairs of another sovereign state. Id. "The concept of
intervention suffers from a lack of definitional clarity." Id. at 17. Intervention is usually
surrounded by contention. Id. at 20; see also Freidrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty's Domin-
ium: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA 33-41 (Gene
M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995). The various reasons offered to justify inter-
vention in the name of humanitarian justice are discussed therein. Id. at 21-42. Interna-
tional lawyers have been engaged in debate for years about the legitimacy of using force to
remedy serious human rights violations. Id. See generally Fernando R. Teson, Changing
Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and Intervention, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note
48, at 35. Controversy is invariably created whenever the U.N. Security Council uses its
1997] SOVEREIGN7Y
maintain vastly different philosophies on politics, economics and
social orders. In the context of a permanent international crimi-
nal tribunal, these differences are manifested by the differing
views nations have as to what constitutes an offense against the
international community.65 As a result, determining the subject
matter jurisdiction of the international criminal court also proved
difficult.66
The International Law Commission attempted to incorporate
different conceptions of criminal justice in its initial proposal.
The provisions of this statute stipulated that the court would have
jurisdiction over the following crimes:68 genocide; 69 aggression; 70
discretion to determine what situations justify its intervention. Id. Recent situations in
Iraq, Somolia and Haiti demonstrate this controversy. Id. at 37.
65 But see Hari M. Osofsky, Domesticating International Law: Bringing Human Rights
Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 204 (1991) (noting that changing view of national
sovereignty under human rights doctrine has resulted in norms transcending national
borders).
66 See Bhattacharyya, supra note 1, at 79-80 (noting that subject matter jurisdiction in
1994 Draft Statute changed considerably from 1993 draft, reflecting concerns about giving
tribunal too much authority); Stuart H. Deming, War Crimes and International Criminal
Law, 28 AKRON L. REV. 421, 423 (1995) (detailing much of debate concerning 1994 Draft
Statute focused on subject matter jurisdiction). See generally U.N.: Draft Code of Crimes
Against Peace of Mankind Should Be Considered in Creating International Criminal Court,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13550460 (reporting on difficulties faced
reaching consensus about court's subject matter jurisdiction).
67 See Crawford, supra note 8, at 406-07 (discussing numerous dilemmas posed by at-
tempts to satisfy various standards of due process, treaties and international law in gen-
eral); see also Leigh, supra note 9, at 114 (noting criticism offered by United States that
categories of offenses are too broad); Levitine, supra note 15, at 43 (observing that it was
difficult to placate American concerns that statute would not recognize idiosyncrasies in
United States criminal procedure law).
68 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 20.
69 See id.; see also id. Commentary to art. 20, at 72. The inclusion of the crime of geno-
cide has not been problematic, as it has already been authoritatively defined at the Geno-
cide Convention. Id. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, genocide means "acts commit-
ted with intent to destroy... a national, ethic, racial or religious group." Id. The 1948
Genocide Convention expressly states that the crime of genocide may be referred to an
international criminal court. Id. The side-scale membership to that convention allows for
this court to have inherent jurisdiction, as the principles of that agreement allow for such
jurisdiction. Id.; see, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951), art. 14 [herein-
after Genocide Convention]. The Convention allows for an international criminal tribunal
to hear cases involving genocide. Id. See generally FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, THE BOSNIAN
PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE: PROCEEDINGS AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CON-
CERNING BOSNIA V. SERBIA ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENO-
CIDE 10 (1996). Genocide is likely to be included within the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion without much opposition. Id.; Stephen P. Marks, Forgetting "The Policies and Practice
of the Past":" Impunity in Cambodia, 18-Fall FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17, 25 (1994). One
major criticism of the Genocide Convention has been its lack of use considering the many
instances in which genocide still occur. Id.
70 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 20; see also id. Commentary to Art. 20, at 72.
Defining the crime of aggression and determining that it's existence presents special
problems because there is not an international agreement comparable to the one for geno-
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serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict (war crimes);7 1 crimes against humanity;7 2 and crimes
that are serious enough to warrant international concern.73
cide. Id.; G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). Aggression is
defined as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State." Id. The first use of an armed force in contraven-
tion of the U.N Charter constitutes prima facie evidence of an act of aggression. Id.; see,
e.g., Jamison, supra note 1, at 427. The failure to define aggression contributed to the fail-
ure to establish an international criminal court in the past. Id.; Robert Rosenstock, The
Forty-Seventh Session of the International Law Commission, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 106, 110
(1996). Aggression is not "susceptible" to definition. Id. Aggression by states has previously
been addressed, however, as it applies to individual criminal responsibility, it has been
ignored. Id. There was much disagreement over whether the general definition should fo-
cus on the use of force, or if it should be limited to more serious violations. Id.
71 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 20; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir.
1996). War crimes were found to be a violation of the law of nations, subjecting the defend-
ants to jurisdiction in American courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Id.; see also 1994
ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to art. 20, at 74-75. War crimes would be included
in the Court's jurisdiction only when they are considered "serious violations" so that not all
war crimes are within the court's jurisdiction. Id. These include both violations of rules
applicable in armed conflict and under customary law, as well as acts listed as "grave
breaches" under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. Id. The Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was used for guidance in
determining what a serious violation would be. Id. See generally Bernard D. Meltzer, "War
Crimes": The Nuremberg Trial and the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 895, 899 (1996). Even Adolf Hitler was not prepared to publicly defend aggressive
war. Id.
72 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 20; see also id. Commentary to Art. 20, at 75-
78. The Commentary notes that crimes against humanity are extreme acts carried out in a
widespread and systematic manner against civilian targets. Id. It follows with the specific
acts enumerated in the Yugoslavia tribunal statute, which includes murder; extermination;
deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecution on political, race and religious
grounds; other inhumane acts. Id. at 75; Colin Warbuck, The United Nations System: A
Place for Criminal Courts?, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 244 (1994). Doubts
were raised as to whether crimes against humanity could be perpetuated during peace
time. Id.; see, e.g., Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.2/
Add.2/Rev. 1 (Apr. 9, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Proceedings]. Crimes against humanity have
inspired great debate with respect to possible inclusion in the jurisdiction of the court. Id.
See generally PHILIP ALsToN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTs: A CTrrIcAL AP-
Pm&sAL (1995). Crimes against humanity will be included in the jurisdiction of the perma-
nent court because of the pervasiveness of human rights in past tribunals. Id.; Bhatta-
charyya, supra note 1, at 98-105. Crimes against humanity will be among the most difficult
to determine for the court's jurisdiction. Id. The definition used in the Commentary, how-
ever, reflects a combination of documents and may therefore be specific enough for practical
application. Id.
73 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 20; see also id. Commentary to Art. 20, at 76-
79. Crimes serious enough to warrant international concern focus on violations condemned
in treaties, such as drug trafficking, acts of terrorism and hijacking. Id. Terrorism is of
particular significance in this category because terrorism has not adequately been defined
in the international community to date. Id. There have been many doubts about the wis-
dom of including these crimes within the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 78-79; see, e.g., Judicial
Intervention, supra note 61, at 34. The countries that are unable to deal with these crimes
through their own legal systems favor the inclusion of these crimes within the court's juris-
diction. Id. The United States has resisted efforts to include drug trafficking, preferring
instead that domestic governments improve their prosecutorial capabilities. Id. See gener-
ally Gilmore, supra note 61, at 275. The demand for international criminal jurisdiction has
come from Caribbean and Central American states that have major problems dealing with
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The draft statute exposes the underlying tension between state
sovereignty and the need for international justice.74 This tension
resulted from trying to obtain state consent to the mechanics of
criminal justice while still effectuating a community of interests. v5
It appears that in order to progress any further, the international
community must somehow separate what states rightfully view as
their individual concerns from those issues common to the rest of
the world. The drafters sought a compromise between the compet-
ing interests by limiting the jurisdiction of the proposed Tribunal
to crimes which have received unequivocal universal condemna-
tion.76 This approach accentuated the potential gain of interna-
tional protection and justice while simultaneously quelling fears
of a loss of sovereignty. 77
1. Crimes Selected Based on a Variety of Factors
There has been great difficulty in selecting the crimes for which
the Court would have subject matter jurisdiction, largely because
of the retention of classical views of sovereignty. 78 The crimes enu-
drug trafficking, and whose criminal justice systems are threatened by organized criminal
gangs. Id.
74 See Gilmore, supra note 61, at 284 (referring to conflict as "nationalism versus
internationalism").
75 See id. at 285 (calling attempts to advance international criminal justice via method of
consensualism "contradictory in its logic").
76 See 1996 Proceedings, supra note 72 (reporting general agreement concerning impor-
tance of limiting jurisdiction to universal crimes to avoid trivializing role of court); see also
Krass, supra note 10, at 352 (arguing that permanent court with strict jurisdictional guide-
lines eliminates argument that court would selectively adjudicate or would fail to be impar-
tial). See generally Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental
Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV.
1, 61-62 (1992) (noting that permanent international criminal tribunal would have deter-
rent effect for crimes enumerated in Draft Statute).
77 See Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and Amer-
ican Concerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121, 122 (1994) (asserting that sovereignty concerns
have erected insurmountable barriers to proposed tribunal's jurisdiction); see also Michael
D. Greenberg, Note, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. IN'L L.J. 119, 134
(1992) (noting slow development of international criminal code was primary obstacle to
permanent criminal court).
78 See, e.g., Anthony P. Maingot, Haiti: Sovereign Consent Versus State-Centric Sover-
eignty, in BEYOND SovEREIGNTY, supra note 48, at 207. Recent changes in perceptions about
human rights are insufficient to overcome the attitude that sovereignty lies with the state
not the people, regardless of who governs. Id. This is an absolute principle of sovereignty.
Id.; Jose A. Baez, An International Crimes Court: Further Tales of the King of Corinth, 23
GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 289, 325 (1993). Two primary concerns regarding a permanent
court are that it is unlikely many nations will cooperate in the prosecution of its own na-
tions and that an international court will limit sovereignty. Id.; Bonnie Santosus, An Inter-
national Criminal Court: "Where Global Harmony Begins", 5 TouRo L. REV. 25, 40 (1994).
The draft statute seeks to eliminate sovereignty issues by allowing members the opportu-
nity to choose which forms of jurisdiction to bind itself. Id.
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merated in the draft statute reflect a combination of treaty law,
customary law and human rights law.79
Treaties are formal agreements between states,8 0 while custom-
ary law is derived from state practice and international legal
norms."' Both depend on state consent, which is a manifestation
of the principle of sovereignty.8 2 Human rights law is problematic
in this context because it is difficult to define.8 3
Human rights law represents a hybrid between treaties and in-
ternational customary international law,8 4 derived from contem-
porary, core human values.15 Human rights law varies considera-
bly from state to state and binds parties without consent, an
essential feature of international law.8 6
The danger in creating jurisdiction based on sweeping catego-
ries of human rights law is that the more powerful states will im-
pose their morality onto others8 7 which creates a direct threat to
79 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at Introduction (noting that many members were
concerned that inclusion of treaty law would leave too many deficiencies).
80 See Henkin, supra note 20, at 35 (distinguishing between customary and treaty law).
81 See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900) (finding that customary law re-
sults from "general assent of all nations"); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
160-61 (1820) (noting customary law principles are established by "consulting the work of
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations;
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law"); Committee of U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing that custom-
ary law emanates from states following customs out of sense of legal obligation); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987) (asserting that "[clustomary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation").
82 See Henkin, supra note 20, at 35 (asserting customary and treaty law are based on
consent).
83 See Fernando R. Teson, Changing Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and Interven-
tion, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 48, at 33 (asserting that human rights violations
have been protected internationally and, as such, been subtracted from exclusive domestic
jurisdiction of states).
84 The UN General Assembly routinely adopts resolutions concerning human rights. See,
e.g., A/Res/46/242 (Bosnia); A/Res/46/133 (El Salvador); AfRes/46/134 (Iraq); A/Res/46/132
(Burma). See generally Henkin, supra note 20, at 32. The author discusses the difficulty in
applying human rights law in practice, as it often contradicts the principles of sovereignty.
Id.
85 See Henkin, supra note 20, at 37 (claiming human rights law has altered principles of
international law and sovereignty).
86 See John A. Perkins, Essay, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From
State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INr'L L.J. 433, 447 (1997) (explaining that
development of certain human rights has progressed to point of being binding customary
international law); cf In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir.
1992) (demonstrating U.S. treatment of cases that affirm jus cogens character of binding
customary international law).
87 See Crawford, supra note 8, at 408 (noting natural tendency of each nation to prefer
its own criminal justice system's values and institutions).
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their sovereignty.88 To reduce this risk, the selection of crimes
over which the proposed tribunal shall have jurisdiction has been
limited to offenses the international community has collectively
condemned in the past. 9 Limiting jurisdiction in this manner en-
sures the prosecution of universally condemned offenses while
avoiding undue encroachment onto Nation's sovereignty.
2. The Need for Concise Definitions
Each sovereign state should not only be allowed to participate in
determining what crimes are within the court's jurisdiction, but
also be involved in actively defining those crimes.90 The final out-
come should reflect both domestic and international dimensions. 9 1
It is imperative to arrive at narrow definitions in order to remove
ambiguities stemming from nations defining crimes differently.92
The final statute should leave no doubt as to what constitutes
criminal conduct under international law.93
The opportunity of each state to take part in formulating con-
cise definitions should alleviate any objections a State might have
88 See Freidrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a Right of Humanita-
rian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA 23 (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds.,
1995). The sovereign is still "subject to natural law and bound by his conscience." Id.; see
also Fernando R. Teson, Changing Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and Intervention,
in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 48, at 33. The author states that human rights are no
longer a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction. Id.
89 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, arts. 22, 26. The court's subject matter jurisdiction
should only contain laws of"such a fundamental character that their violation gives rise to
the criminal responsibility of individuals." Id.; see also Blakesley, supra note 1, at 112.
Existing multilateral treaties, as well as crimes generally derived from accepted principles
of international law, will provide the basis for the proposed court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Id.; Leigh, supra note 9, at 118. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to crimes
under general international law because of the magnitude, recurrence and the predictable
international consequences of those crimes. Id.
90 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 5, at 23 (asserting that it is essential for all
affected parties to have meaningful participation in formulation of decisions).
91 See id. at 23 (suggesting that any process to develop new legal norms should accom-
modate all participants and incorporate both domestic and international issues).
92 See Farah Hussain, Note, A Functional Response to International Crime: An Interna-
tional Justice Commission, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 755, 769-770 (1996) (discussing repeated
failure to adopt international criminal code); see also Ferencz, supra note 46, at 375 (dis-
cussing causal link between failed efforts in creating international criminal court and lack
of criminal code).
93 See Pickard, supra note 3, at 442. The idea of an international criminal court is often
challenged on the ground that there is no clear compilation of prohibited conduct pursuant
to international law that gives adequate notice to potential offenders. Id.; see also Hussain,
supra note 92, at 770. The principle "nullum crimen sine lege, nulla puena sine lege" is also
important in this context. Id. See generally BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 176 (6th ed. 1990).
Literally translated, this phrase means "no crime without law, no punishment without
law." Id.
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based on sovereignty concerns.94 Furthermore, the draft statute
envisions a permanent court established by treaty.95 The demo-
cratic process of treaty negotiation and formation ensures each
State the ability to retain their sovereignty in international
affairs.96
B. When the Court May Exercise Its Jurisdiction
Further debate exists over when a permanent international
criminal court may exercise its jurisdiction.9 7 Currently, a nation
has the power to submit to only portions of a multilateral agree-
ment 98 and the proposed statute adheres to this by allowing signa-
tories latitude in deciding which offenses should qualify for the
proposed Court's jurisdiction. 99 The lone exception to this proce-
dure is the crime of genocide:100 If a state is a party to both the
Statute and the Genocide Convention, the Court would have in-
herent jurisdiction over the commission of this crime.' 01
94 See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 176
(1992). 'The prospect of arriving at a sufficient, coherent, and systematic code of offenses
that will meet criminal justice standards of legality does not seem to be insurmountable."
Id.
95 See Keith Highet et al., International Courts and Tribunals, 31 INT'L LAw. 599, 608
(1997) (explaining Preparatory Committee's view that establishing court by treaty ensures
its independence and authority).
96 See id. (explaining international treaty process).
97 See Podgers, supra note 8, at 62 (stating that debate over form and jurisdiction of
permanent criminal court intensifies as reality of its formation approaches); see also Law
Without Borders, supra note 8, at 111-12 (discussing jurisdictional issues involved with
international criminal court).
98 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Arts. 21 and 22, at 79-84 (discuss-
ing when Court's jurisdiction is invoked); see also Crawford, supra note 8, at 410 (discuss-
ing jurisdictional system of ILC Draft Statute); Jamison, supra note 1, at 435 (stating that
Draft Statute proposes that states be allowed to choose their own obligations under multi-
lateral conventions); Krass, supra note 10, at 362 (discussing when Court could exercise
jurisdiction).
99 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 22; see also Task Force, supra note 60, at 475
(defining jurisdiction of International Court as concurrent with that of member states, cov-
ering established international crimes and contingent on individual member state's stipu-
lation that court's jurisdiction covers specific crime); see, e.g., Crawford, supra note 8, at
143 (stating that Article 24 defines when consent or acceptance of jurisdiction is needed for
court to deal with specific crime). See generally Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on
the Need for an International Criminal Court, 1991 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 135, 141
(discussing problems associated with state's conferring jurisdiction on international crimi-
nal court for certain crimes).
100 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, arts. 21, 25 (setting forth genocide provisions); see
also Crawford, supra note 8, at 411 (explaining genocide's status as only crime within "in-
herent" jurisdiction of Court).
101 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 21 (proposing "inherent jurisdiction" solely
over crime of genocide); Crawford, supra note 8, at 412 (asserting Genocide Convention
reinforces 'inherent jurisdiction" of international criminal court over genocide). But see
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The International Law Commission notes the importance of
mandating genocide because of the extreme nature of the of-
fense"0 2 coupled with the safeguard that it is easy to prove.' 03
Therefore, in genocide cases, the court could proceed without the
consent of the affected States. 10 4
1. Inherent Jurisdiction
Inherent jurisdiction gives a court the power to hear cases with-
out receiving an express grant of authority.10 5 States are gener-
ally leery of this type of jurisdiction because it encroaches upon
the principles of national sovereignty.10 6 Inherent jurisdiction
would appear to limit sovereignty because it allows external forces
to encroach upon the internal mechanisms of administering jus-
tice absent prior consent. 10 7 Inherent jurisdiction is also incom-
patible with the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the United Nations
Levitine, supra note 15, at 36 (noting Genocide Convention did not delegate to interna-
tional tribunal ability to punish, but instead created concurrent jurisdiction with domestic
courts).
102 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Art. 21, at 81, 82 (discussing
general consensus that genocide is widely condemned internationally); see also Leigh,
supra note 9, at 118 (asserting that Commission viewed prohibition of genocide to be of
"fundamental significance"). See generally Robert C. Johansen, Will We Do Nothing?
Preventing Genocide, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 20, 1996, at 316 (discussing inability of
present system to prevent genocide, whose commission has become alarmingly common).
103 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Art. 21, at 81, 82 (noting relative
ease in proving acts of genocide); see also Leigh, supra note 9, at 118 (agreeing that dis-
putes about proving whether or not genocide actually occurred were "limited").
104 See Leigh, supra note 9, at 118-19 (asserting that Court should have inherent juris-
diction over genocide by virtue of State's participation in Draft Statute).
105 See BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 782 (6th ed. 1990) (defining inherent powers as those
which are above and beyond those expressly granted); see, e.g., Charles T. Main Intl, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Author., 651 F.2d 800, 809 (1st Cir. 1981) (describing Execu-
tive's inherent power to confer authority on President to settle foreign claims).
106 See Jamison, supra note 1, at 431 (commenting on belief that any interference with
sovereignty is threatening to individual nations); see also Brand, supra note 12, at 1686
(predicting future development of international law will be determined by continuing
evolution of sovereignty); see, e.g., Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (stating that inherent juris-
diction of international court requires states to relinquish their jurisdiction). See generally
John Linarelli, An Examination of the Proposed Crime of Intervention in the Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 44
(1995) (discussing controversy concerning International Court's inherent jurisdiction in
light of sovereignty issues).
107 See HURST HANNum, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE Ac-
COMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 23-28 (1996) (stating that since inherent jurisdiction
of outside court is incompatible with sovereignty this goal is impossible to achieve); see also
Reisman, supra note 21, at 866 (explaining various meanings of sovereignty). See generally
48 C.J.S. International Law §§ 25-29 (1981) (covering exercise of sovereignty).
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from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state." 08
Inherent jurisdiction, however, is not necessarily an encroach-
ment on state sovereignty. 10 9 It is commonly believed in the inter-
national community that a state forfeits its sovereignty when its
actions are universally condemned." 0
The main role of a sovereign state is to provide security and pro-
tection for its own people."' Often, especially in internal armed
conflict, domestic courts are incapable of handling matters relat-
ing to that conflict; providing a mechanism for international
assistance will provide order and security. 1 2 This ensures that
sovereignty concerns are met."
3
2. Complementary Jurisdiction
The Draft Statute intends for the court's jurisdiction to comple-
ment those national criminal justice systems whose trial proce-
dures are unavailable or ineffective." 4 Domestic courts are often
fully capable of handling matters enumerated in the proposed
108 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state"); see also Holly A. Osterland, Note, National Self-Determination
and Secession: The Slovak Model, 25 CASE W. REs. J. INT'a L. 655, 670 (1993) (discussing
principles of national sovereignty and its application to U.N. Charter).
109 See Arniston, supra note 45, at 207 (contending that sovereignty carries humanita-
rian duties and responsibilities that when breached, "eviscerate sovereignty").
110 See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that human rights
violations are abuse of sovereignty if carried out under authority of state); see also MARTI-
NEz, supra note 45, at 12 (differentiating between limitations to sovereignty which are revo-
cable, versus transfer of sovereignty, which is not); see, e.g., Judicial Intervention, supra
note 61 (expressing concern over increasing instances of war crimes). See generally FOWLER
& BUNCK, supra note 5, at 41-45 (explaining that sovereign state's failure to protect its
inhabitants is tantamount to transferring its sovereign power to one who will).
111 See Brand, supra note 12, at 1696 (describing sovereign state's obligation to protect
and provide security for its citizens).
112 See Jamison, supra note 1, at 432. An international criminal court will help nations
to protect their sovereign rights and actually empower them in their goal of protecting their
inhabitants. Id.
113 See id. "[Bly limiting its sovereignty, a state proves it is a sovereignty." (quoting M.
CHERIF BASIoUNI & VED P. NENDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME
II, Jurisdiction and Cooperation 17 (1986)).
114 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Preamble (stating Court "is intended to exercise
jurisdiction only over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole ... [and] to be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where
[their] trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective"); see also Bhatta-
charyya, supra note 1, at 82 (noting that Statute seeks to limit Court's jurisdiction to ap-
propriate cases). See generally Crawford, supra note 8, at 410 (discussing jurisdictional
system of ILC Draft Statute).
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statute." 5 Therefore, in spite of the Court's jurisdiction, each
state's national court system remains the more appropriate venue
to hear cases and that power would not be usurped. 1 16 This princi-
ple is known as "complementarity" and it refers to the relationship
between the International Criminal Court and national judicial
systems." 7 It allows for the international court to complement or
take over prosecutions only when national courts are unwilling or
unable to function effectively. 118
The difficulty with complementarity arises in its application. 1 9
The principle concern of nations is a loss of sovereignty through
arbitrary decision-making regarding the availability and effective-
ness of their own prosecutorial functions. 2 ° There is a fear that
an international court will have too much power to criticize the
115 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Art. 23, at 82-84 (noting domestic
prosecutions, if feasible, are preferable to international adjudication); see also Jamison,
supra note 1, at 435 (stating that exclusive jurisdiction of International Criminal Court
over certain crimes entails states giving up jurisdictional rights over such crimes); see, e.g.,
Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (noting that exclusive jurisdiction would require countries to
"relinquish, in advance, their authority to undertake domestic prosecutions" with respect to
certain categories of crime). See generally Krass, supra note 10, at 1366 (stating that exclu-
sive jurisdiction would mean sole jurisdiction over certain international crimes).
116 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Preamble, at 44 (emphasizing
that International Court intends to operate only when it is unlikely person would be tried
nationally); see also Evered, supra note 77, at 138-41 (discussing various proposals that
would allow States to retain jurisdiction within international court system); see, e.g., How-
ard S. Levie, Evaluating Present Options for an International Criminal Court, 149 MIL. L.
REV. 129, 134 (1995) (noting that Draft Statute for International Criminal Court provides
solely for concurrent jurisdiction).
117 See Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 93, at 160-62 (discussing implementation of
International Court with respect to jurisdiction and complementarity).
118 See 1996 Proceedings, supra note 72 (defining "complementarity"); see also Walsh,
supra note 6, at 111 (reporting that individual nations have not fulfilled their duty to prose-
cute most human rights violators); see, e.g., Leigh, supra note 9, at 122 (discussing comple-
mentary nature of jurisdiction of court). See generally Task Force, supra note 60, at 499
(discussing most compatible options for International Court that would complement, rather
than compete with, prosecutions in national tribunals).
119 See Preparatory on International Committee Continues Considering Complementarity
Between National, International Jurisdiction, UN PREss RELEASE, L/2773, Apr. 2, 1996
<http'J/gopher.un.org> [hereinafter Committee Continues Considering] (reporting on vari-
ous concerns of participating nations); see, e.g., James H. Carter, Chair, American Bar As-
sociation Section of International Law and Practice and the Standing Committee on World
Order Under Law Reports to the House of Delegates, II. International Criminal Court, 29
IN-'L LAw. 300, 302 (1995) (noting that position taken by U.S. Commission is that creation
of International Criminal Court should merely complement national criminal justice
systems).
120 See 1996 Proceedings, supra note 72 (noting there is no system in place to determine
when national system is inadequate); see also Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (noting grave
concern over court's power to decide when it will intervene since it will require significant
relinquishment of sovereignty). See generally Leigh, supra note 9, at 122 (noting that
United States considers many provisions in Draft Statute at odds with principle of
complementarity).
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procedures of national courts. 1 2 1 To further complicate matters, it
is unclear as to who will make such determinations or what crite-
ria would be used. 122
These concerns are meritorious and mandate that only after
clearly defined criteria are met may the International Court take
over prosecutorial functions. 123 A formal procedure for making
such a determination must clearly be established before the court
is vested with this power. 124 The balancing of interests falls on
vesting the Court with this power because it eliminates the possi-
bility that wrongdoing states will use sovereignty as a veil to avoid
unwanted interference. 125 The concepts of international justice
should therefore mandate that the international community re-
tain this power. 126 Empowering an international criminal court to
step in, when national systems prove incapable or unwilling to
punish the perpetrators of serious crimes, ensures that its estab-
lishment will not be of limited value. 1 27
121 See Committee Continues Considering, supra note 119 (describing debate over com-
plementarity and its implications); see also Warbuck, supra note 72, at 243 (asserting that
International Criminal Court is not intended to supplant national criminal jurisdiction).
122 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Considerations on Inter-State Cooperation in Crimi-
nal Matters, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 144-45 (1992) (discussing ways in which complemen-
tary processes will work efficiently without sacrificing proper legal procedures or violating
individual human rights).
123 See Bassiouni & Blakesly, supra note 94, at 169 (lamenting that approach for exclu-
siveness is most difficult to achieve politically); see also Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (not-
ing disadvantage of this approach is that it requires most significant relinquishment of
sovereignty); see, e.g., Evered, supra note 77, at 141 (stating that United States in particu-
lar has grave reservations about proposed authority of Court); Leigh, supra note 9, at 123
(asserting that Court's jurisdiction must be properly addressed within concept of
complementarity).
124 See Committee Continues Considering, supra note 119. Suggestions offered by the
delegates have merit: France recommended that the International Court prosecute only
when it was clear that national courts would free the accused from international responsi-
bility, or deliberately undertook a bad faith prosecution. Id. Australia hoped that the Inter-
national Court would not defer to sham proceedings by States not prosecuting in good faith.
Id. The United States suggested utilizing a check list of criteria to determine exactly what
constitutes bad faith. Id.
125 See, e.g., Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 94, at 169 (detailing how system will
limit practice of invoking defense of national sovereignty).
126 See Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (noting that Court's ability to make final decision of
whether to prosecute will facilitate development of "coherent and consistent body of law").
See generally Jamison, supra note 1, at 426 (explaining how Court's jurisdiction will
function).
127 See Morris & Bourloyannis-Vrailis, supra note 62, at 496 (reporting that principle of
complementarity is considered to be essential to acceptance of permanent court); see, e.g.,
Leigh, supra note 9, at 123 (detailing United States' position in favor of complementarity).
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3. Opt-in Jurisdiction
For the other enumerated crimes, the draft statute gives States
the option to submit to the Court's jurisdiction. 128  This system
allows states to "opt-in" because jurisdiction is conferred upon the
Court only by consent of the member State.12 9 This declaration
can contain any or all applicable crimes, conduct, or time periods
that the State chooses, and limits the Court's jurisdiction to those
specifications. 131
There is considerable opposition to the opt-in approach, primar-
ily because it allows for variations creating inconsistency and un-
predictability.131 Many argue that all enumerated offenses should
be subject to inherent jurisdiction to remove these problems and
ensure proper enforcement.' 32 Adding further complication is the
fact that the enumerated crimes are often committed in one occur-
rence and the opt-in approach, with its allowance for variation,
creates waste in handling these matters.' 33
The opt-in approach, however, is probably a necessary evil in
order to facilitate acceptance from member States, as it respects
the prevailing value placed on sovereignty in the international
community.13 4 In other words, the opt-in approach is consistent
128 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 22 (proscribing acceptance of jurisdiction of
court); see also Krass, supra note 10, at 355 (enumerating possible jurisdictional options).
See generally Levitine, supra note 15, at 35-38 (discussing proposed jurisdiction).
129 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Art. 22, at 82-84 (noting Article
was drafted to facilitate state acceptance of both Statute and Court's jurisdiction).
130 See id. (noting that formal declaration by individual states is needed before Court
obtains jurisdiction over them). But see Jamison, supra note 1, at 426 (asserting that many
states actually prefer inherent jurisdiction approach). See generally Nanette Dumas, Note,
Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human Rights Court and
Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 585, 593 (1990) (describing Court's
various jurisdictional options).
131 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Art. 22, at 84 (claiming that this
type of jurisdiction would empty statute of any real content); see also Evered, supra note
77, at 142-45 (elaborating on various objections to opt-in jurisdiction).
132 See Morris & Bourloyannis-Vrailis, supra note 62, at 496-99 (offering rationale for
objections to opt-in jurisdiction); see also Jamison, supra note 1, at 426 (noting that many
states prefer inherent jurisdiction approach).
133 See Bassiouni & Blakesly, supra note 94, at 162 (noting that opt-in approach could
ostensibly allow jurisdiction over only selected crimes, even if others are simultaneously
committed); see also Universality of International Criminal Court Requires Participation of
All States Preparatory Process, M2 PREsswiRE, Nov. 7, 1996, part I, available in 1996 WL
13549264, part II, available in 1996 WL 13549265 (highlighting discussions of Preparatory
Committee).
134 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, Commentary to Art. 22, at 82 (noting Article 22
was drafted to facilitate acceptance by states); see also Morris & Bourloyannis-Vrailis,
supra note 62, at 496 (predicting that several states likely will not accept court without
jurisdictional guarantees).
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with the present day concept of sovereignty, which presumes that
each sovereign state can only be bound by those commitments it
willingly enters into with other sovereign states.
4. The Role of the Security Council
The Security Council is a body of the United Nations, consisting
of five permanent and ten temporary nations. 3 5 There has been a
great deal of controversy over the possible control the Security
Council may exert in the exercise of the International Court's ju-
risdiction.'36 The United States, a permanent member of the Se-
curity Council, favors a "triggering mechanism" through which
the Council would select which cases would eventually be heard
by the International Criminal Court.
37
The 1994 draft statute states that "[n]o prosecution may be com-
menced under this Statute arising from a situation which is being
dealt with by the Security Council.. . unless the Security Council
otherwise decides."138 This provision has raised concerns that the
Council could effectively preclude proceedings before the Court
135 See CHRISTIAN ToMusCHAT, THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFrY: A LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIE 39-42 (1995) (discussing how Security Council was established by U.N. Charter); see
also Gernot Erler, Essay, Germany's Role in the Post-Cold War World, 1 UCLA J. INTL &
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 20 n.9 (1996) (dubbing five permanent members "permanent five" and de-
tailing their history); Judy A. Gallant, Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council
Resolution 688: A Reappraisal in Light of a Changing World Order, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 881, 890 (1992) (examining powers of five permanent and ten temporary Security
Council members); Walter J. Lemanski, Note, The Reemergence of German Arms: How Far
Will Germany's March Toward Full Use of Military Force Go?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L.
857, 874 n.104 (1996) (discussing veto power of five permanent members).
136 See 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 23 (establishing Security Council's role in
selecting suitable crimes for court to adjudicate); see also Carter, supra note 119, at 300
(suggesting that jurisdiction of international criminal court should be granted to Security
Council). See generally Human Rights: U.S., Western Powers Hit for Ignoring Abuses, INT'L
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14476668 (characterizing Security
Council's opposition to international criminal court as "a low point").
137 See Juan E. Mendez and Richard Dicker, Creating an International Criminal Court;
Lukewarm U.S. Support Hampers Prospect, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al (noting that
this mechanism would also give Council veto power); see also Cynthia Brown, Human
Rights and Wrongs-1995: Global Update, NATION, Dec. 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL
12423494 (calling use of Security Council "transparent attempt" to retain veto power so
U.S. government would remain off-limits to human rights scrutiny); Evered, supra note 77,
at 142-45 (describing United States' position favoring use of triggering mechanism). See
generally John F. Harris, Clinton Pushes for U.N. War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, Oct.
16, 1995, at A4 (discussing United States opposition to allowing International Criminal
Court to hear cases absent permanent member's prior approval).
138 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, art. 23 (stating that court may not prosecute matters
before Security Council). See generally Task Force, supra note 60, at 480-84 (discussing
procedure to invoke Article 23 rights for individual states).
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simply by taking the matter up under for itself.139 Given the polit-
ical nature of the Security Council, this provision could affect the
Court's independence. 4 0
While it may appear as though the Security Council would exert
too much power over the proposed Court, the active role the Coun-
cil would play would alleviate concerns relating to the Court's im-
permissible infringement on sovereignty.' 4 1  Maintaining the
Court's subordinate status to the Security Council is appropriate
because it ensures that the Council satisfies its obligation to pre-
serve international peace and security, 142 it would help to provide
political backing to the Court's decisions 43 and would prevent the
arbitrary use of the Court.'4 4 It also should be observed that it is
139 See Sienho Yee, A Proposal to Reformulate Article 23 of the ILC Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 529-31 (1996)
(describing reactions to triggering mechanism aspect of Article 23); see, e.g., Evered, supra
note 77, at 139 (predicting U.S. would not accept Court without triggering mechanism). See
generally Task Force, supra note 60, at 489 (explaining application of triggering
mechanism).
140 See Burns, supra note 50, at 348 (detailing political nature of Security Council, par-
ticularly its effect on court); see also Evered, supra note 77, at 142-45 (describing U.S. posi-
tion); Yee, supra note 139, at 529-31 (noting Article 23 allows Security Council to control
Court merely by placing item on its own agenda). But see Morris & Bourloyannis-Vrailas,
supra note 62, at 614 (claiming United States is in minority with its cautious approach to
Court).
141 See Diego A. Rotsztain, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1954 (1996) (asserting that U.S.
sovereignty would be impermissibly compromised if foreign laws were allowed to interfere
with domestic prosecutions); see also Jamison, supra note 1, at 452-54 (asserting that
United States will be most difficult nation to convince). See generally Edward K. Kwakwa,
The Role of International Law in U.S. Foreign Policymaking, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
434, 450-53 (1992) (describing U.S. foreign policy in relation to international law).
142 See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The Security Council is authorized to "determine the exist-
ence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression" and to determine actions
to "maintain or restore international peace and security." Id.; see also Evered, supra note
77, at 142-45. The United Nations is concerned that the Court will exert too much author-
ity. Id.
143 See Mendez & Dicker, supra note 137, at Al (describing benefits of screening pro-
cess); see also Burns, supra note 50, at 346 (explaining screening process); cf Leslie Deak,
The UN Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 20, 22-23
(1993) (suggesting that politics should be kept out of prosecutorial proceedings).
144 See Mendez & Dicker, supra note 137, at Al (endorsing use of Security Council); see
also 140 CONG. REC. S 96-01 (daily ed. June 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms) (expres-
sing concern that representatives of terrorist countries could sit in judgment of American
citizens); Levitine, supra note 15, at 43 (asserting that U.S. criminal law and procedure lies
at heart of its objections to statute); Scharf, supra note 98, at 163 (suggesting that applying
law of transferring state would run afoul of U.S. Constitution); William Pfaff, International
Court Could Deter War Crimes By Indicting the Leaders, CH. TRiB., July 30, 1996, at A17
(claiming opportunity to establish important precedent of individual accountability for war
crimes is being discarded for American domestic political reasons). See generally Michael
D. Greenberg, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT L L.J. 119, 134-35
(1992) (discussing U.S. concern that transnational law would oppose carefully laid common
and constitutional law).
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not an abdication of sovereign authority to delegate functions and
authority to a global system of law when it is appropriate to effec-
tuate international justice. 145
III. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
In order to be a truly effective adjudicatory body, the proposed
Court must establish mechanisms allowing for the extradition,
prosecution and punishment of those committing acts that trigger
its jurisdiction. 146 Sovereignty, however, poses a direct obstacle to
these enforcement powers. 147 Historically, states have been reluc-
tant to intervene in the affairs and territory of other sovereign
states. 14 A permanent international criminal court would require
states to interfere in the sovereignty of other states 149 so that ex-
tradition, fact finding and resource gathering could be
effectuated. 15
0
145 See Brand, supra note 12, at 1696 (noting in many cases, it is abdication of sovereign
authority not to delegate it); see also Levitine, supra note 15, at 35-38 (suggesting that
Court does not threaten sovereignty of nations but may in fact help it).
146 See David Stoelting, International Courts Flourish in 1990's: Nations Cede Authority,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at S2 (commenting that proposed Court's lack of enforcement mech-
anisms or police force means individual countries will be relied upon to provide assistance,
surrender indictees and gather evidence); see also Osofsky, supra note 65, at 204 (noting
that practical limitation of international system is that it lacks enforcement mechanisms);
Farhan Haq, Rights: Support Growing for "Effective" Criminal Court, INT'L PRESS SERVICE,
Dec. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13258070 (noting fact that some governments want
Court to face same extradition laws because other courts will complicate things).
147 See United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al., Case No. 9, reprinted in IV TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.
10411, 462 (1950) (stating enforcement mechanisms are constrained by practicalities of
national sovereignty); see also Law Without Borders, supra note 8, at 139 (noting Court will
be ineffective unless nations are willing to use power to bring perpetrators to justice and
enforce court's judgments).
148 See Pamela Brondo, International Law: The Use of the Torture Victims Protection Act
as an Enforcement Mechanism, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 221, 225-26 (1997) (asserting
that in spite of presence of human rights, declarations, conventions, customary norms and
treaties, enforcement and implementation remain problematic); see also Brand, supra note
12, at 1689 (discussing role of sovereign as provider of peace and security); see, e.g., Stoel-
ing, supra note 147 (reporting that ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia
have been hampered by lack of state cooperation). See generally Burying the Dead in Yugo-
slavia. Families: Serbs Hiding a Massacre, NEWSDAY (New York), Mar. 11, 1998, at A16
(noting China's position that ongoing violence in Serbia is domestic matter and action by
U.N. would be inappropriate).
149 See Beth van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide
Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2260 (1997) (lamenting that past human
rights abusers have escaped accountability due to lack of enforcement mechanisms at in-
ternational level); see also Farhan Haq, U.N. Outlook: 1997 Brings New Leader, Same Old
Problems, INT'L PRESS SERVICE, available in 1996 WL 14476899 (noting lack of consensus
over whether individual states will comply with International Criminal Court).
150 See David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophi-
cal Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411,436 (1996) (calling present cooperation of interna-
tional organizations "a facade" that does nothing to effectively limit sovereignty); see also
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In discussing enforcement, scholars have tended to divide inter-
national crimes into two groups: Crimes perpetrated by states
(state-led) and crimes perpetuated by individuals (individual non-
state actors).' 51 The sanctions of the U.N. Charter, such as the
interruption of economic relations, severance of diplomatic rela-
tions, and blockades, are typically imposed for state led crimes.1 52
These sanctions serve to punish the perpetrators while also pun-
ishing the population as a whole. 153 Therefore, traditional penal
sanctions such as an international prison or international commu-
nity service seem to be the preferable punishment mechanism of
an international criminal court because these types of sanctions
are limited to punishing only the responsible State. 54
In reality, the enforcement by such a court is complicated be-
cause a state must consent to intervention by participating in the
International Criminal Court. 55 Such participation is tanta-
mount to consenting to intervention in a state's internal affairs. 156
Enabling a state to give its prior consent to intervention by the
international court will placate sovereignty concerns, however, it
will not eliminate them.157
Law Without Borders, supra note 8, at 139 (asserting that court's success depends upon full
cooperation of entire international community).
151 See LYAL S. SuNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 128 (1992) (differentiating between state led versus individu-
ally committed crimes); see also Jarat Chopra, Achilles' Heel in Somolia: Learning from a
Conceptual Failure, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 495, 498 (1996) (noting crimes committed by individ-
uals versus state-led acts are perceived and punished differently).
152 See III M. CHERIF BASSIoUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, Enforcement 13 (1987)
(discussing various sanctions employed by United Nations). See generally THE HANDBOOK
OF HUMANITARIAN LAw IN ARMED CONFLICTS 517-550 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) (detailing en-
forcement of international humanitarian law).
153 See BASSIoUNI, supra note 152, at 14 (suggesting usual U.N. sanctions are inappro-
priate against individual actors).
154 See Jamison, supra note 1, at 439 (asserting that imprisonment is more effective to
punish individual actors than economic sanctions levied against state); see also Osofsky,
supra note 65, at 208 (noting that while sanctions are inadequate, imprisonment will raise
logistical difficulties without help from national prison systems).
155 See Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (discussing how state's participation in interna-
tional court will affect manner in which court may intervene in state's affairs).
156 See Jordan H. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain- Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice
and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 551, 577 (1993) (noting
states often consent to intervention to protect citizens against powerful human right viola-
tors); see, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1733 (1997) (allowing for U.S. intervention into foreign territory
if foreign state has consented).
157 See Scharf, supra note 99, at 160 (noting such consent will protect principle of sover-
eignty); see also David J. Scheffer, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997
WL 12331695 (asserting "shield of sovereignty" has long prevented enforcement of individ-
ual responsibility against egregious violators of international law).
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Enforcement measures are further complicated by the fact that
the territorial boundaries of a sovereign state are constantly
changing. 158 The nature and identities of states are often elu-
sive.' 5 9 This problem was best exemplified by the United Nation's
intervention into the war in the former Yugoslavia.- 60
In this conflict, it was widely believed that the gross human
rights violations committed in Yugoslavia justified interven-
tion.16 ' This intervention was not viewed as an improper threat to
Yugoslavia's sovereignty because Yugoslavia had been a signatory
to many of the international agreements which would have al-
lowed it. 162 Therefore, since Yugoslavia had given its prior con-
sent, there should not have been any basis to object to that
intervention. 163
The newly formed states of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Srpska,
however, contended that they were not subject to any agreements
that bound Yugoslavia. 66 Therefore, they claimed that the en-
forcement measures taken by the U.N. impermissibly violated
state sovereignty. Arguably, this position could be used to refute
the actions of a permanent court as well.
The ad hoc Tribunals adjudicating war crimes in the former Yu-
goslavia and Rwanda are being monitored closely to determine the
158 See James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 93, 120 (1977) (noting there is no rule that state must be fully defined before it is
respected).
159 See Jaret Chopra, The Obsolescence of Intervention under International Law, in SuB-
DUING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 4, at 34 (noting that although intervention implies crossing
boundaries, borders are less distinguishable); see also Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sover-
eignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 452
(1983) (noting that although international agreements have precisely defined boundaries,
they are frequently subject to dispute).
160 See Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT'L L.
243, 261 (1997) (dubbing situation in former Yugoslavia "a grim example" of how sover-
eignty constrained much needed intervention).
161 See Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice of Military Justice: Which Is the
Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rule of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 475, 481 (1995) (discussing daily news-
casts revealing widespread atrocities committed in former Yugoslavia).
162 See generally Kresock, supra note 14, at 219-20 (discussing history of Yugoslavia's
involvement with United Nations).
163 See THoMAs, supra note 20, at 48 (noting that non-intervention in domestic affairs
reflects acceptance of sovereign state as fundamental unit of political organization in to-
day's international system).
164 See Thomas Omestad, The Brief for a World Court: A Permanent War-Crimes Tribu-
nal is Coming, But Will it Have Teeth?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 6, 1997, at 25
(reporting that Bosnian authorities have refused to cooperate, hand over suspects, and con-
tinue to ignore Security Council mandates and signed peace accords).
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viability of a permanent court. 165 To date, seventy seven individu-
als have been indicted in those tribunals, but only twenty are in
custody. 166 This raises questions concerning the tribunal's en-
forcement mechanisms and casts serious doubts about the effec-
tiveness of these tribunals and any permanent ones. 67
The reluctance of the United Nations or any individual state to
bring the accused into custody again reflects the strength of the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. 168 Here, the prin-
ciples of non-intervention are clashing directly with the need for
international justice.'69 The lack of indicted individuals in custody
suggests that the principles of sovereignty have prevailed. 70
165 See William Pfaff, War Crimes Panel Could Set Crucial Precedent, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4092225 (reporting that experience with ad hoc
tribunals will guide establishment of permanent tribunal); see also Elisa Massimino, Inter-
national Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. 10, 10 (1996) (stating many believe fate of perma-
nent court is riding on success of Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals); Symposium, Panel
III, Identifying and Prosecuting War Crimes: The Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 631, 656 (1996) (noting that International Criminal Court must
not only be fair, but also be perceived as such to avoid appearance of "victor's justice,"
which was criticism of Nuremberg trials).
166 See Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Judge Assails West's Failure to Seize Serb Sus-
pects, INVL HERALD TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at 12 (reporting that Tribunal's former chief pros-
ecutor has questioned point of keeping tribunals going since no one was willing to arrest
suspects); see also News Briefs, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1997, at Al (providing grim statistics of
prosecutors in ad hoc tribunals). But see Danielle Lachman, Human Right in Bosnia: Im-
plementing an Effective Prosecution, 8 FLA. L. REV. 325, 330 (1993) (claiming that indict-
ments alone will deter crime, serving to make suspects "international pariahs" who can
never leave their own land).
167 See M.A. Stapleton, UN Tribunals Not Soon to Be Main Source of International Jus-
tice: Ex-Prosecutor, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 8, 1996, at Al (reporting that former chief
prosecutor, based upon his experience with Ad Hoc Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, feels
that permanent international criminal court is "a long way off"); see also Brenton L. Saun-
ders, The World's Forgotten Lesson: The Punishment of War Criminals in the Former Yugo-
slavia, 8 TEmP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 357, 371 (1994) (stating that although U.N. seems to
prosecute those responsible for crimes, its effort has been less than Nuremberg approach);
see, e.g., Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Problems and Prospects, 18-Fall FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 15 (1994) (suggesting explana-
tions for Ad Hoc Tribunal's lack of success).
168 See Brondo, supra note 124, at 236. The author asserts that the acceptance of basic
human rights in principle has not been enough to end the violations of those rights. Id.
People, governments and nations continue to violate human rights even with the advent of
declarations, conventions and enforcement mechanisms. Id.
169 See Omestad, supra note 166, at 26 (predicting Court will lack Nuremberg Court's
authority to enforce its rulings); see also Scheffer, supra note 159 (calling enforcement of
international criminal law "the greatest challenge" of twenty-first century).
170 See Gillian Sharpe, The Tribunal and the Twitch Factor, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 17,
1996, at A40 (noting that precious few people seem to care about tribunal; citing lack of
reporters still covering story which has been deemed "old news"); see also Bosnia's Casual,
Visible 'Wanted', NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1997, at A15 (reporting that although locating war
crime suspects is relatively easy, finding someone prepared to arrest them is difficult);
Slighting Justice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3334822 (claiming U.S.
interest in investigating and gathering evidence and funds has dropped).
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CONCLUSION
Sovereignty has long been viewed as the most fundamental
right of a nation and many nations continue to believe that any
infringement on sovereignty is impermissible. The doctrine that a
state has absolute authority, independent of the affairs of other
nations is outdated and unrealistic. An international criminal
court would give the international community the power to act
against the crimes of universal concern. It also will protect a
state's sovereign rights over crimes committed by protecting them
in an international system when in the past they had no power to
act. There is a balance between a society's right to its sovereignty
and the right of the international community to ensure punish-
ment of criminal behavior for certain acts which otherwise would
go unpunished. Sovereignty must not be a guise which allows for
the continuance of international criminal behavior.
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